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Summary. We analyse bill cosponsorship networks in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. In
comparison with other parliaments, a distinguishing feature of the Chamber is the large number
of political groups. Our analysis aims to infer the pattern of collaborations between these groups
from data on bill cosponsorships.We propose an extension of stochastic block models for edge-
valued graphs and derive measures of group productivity and of collaboration between political
parties. As the model proposed encloses a large number of parameters, we pursue a penalized
likelihood approach that enables us to infer a sparse reduced graph displaying collaborations
between political parties.
Keywords: Adaptive lasso; Bill cosponsorship; Community structure; Network; Penalized
likelihood; Stochastic block model
1. Introduction
The legislative process in modern democracies typically involves three fundamental steps: the
proposal of a bill, a discussion on its contents and a final vote on it. Throughout this pro-
cess, many interactions and collaborations can arise between different political actors, who join
their efforts to support, change or oppose a proposed legislation. The analysis of these interac-
tions can, then, provide insight into the features and the mode of operation of different parlia-
ments, and on the way and the extent to which these interactions can influence the legislative
process.
Two types of data are often considered in this context. The first is represented by bill cospon-
sorships networks (Fowler, 2006; Rocca and Sanchez, 2007; Parigi and Sartori, 2014). A parlia-
mentarian can sponsor a bill individually, or cosponsor it together with other parliamentarians.
In the latter case, bill cosponsorship implies a formal collaboration between its proponents, who
officially state their agreement and support of the legislation proposed. The second is given by
roll-call votes (Kirkland, 2014; Dal Maso et al., 2014), in which parliamentarians express their
final decision on a bill.
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In this paper we study bill cosponsorship in the Italian Chamber of Deputies over the last
four legislatures, covering the period 2001–2015. We represent bill cosponsorships by means
of an undirected graph, where a weighted edge displays the number of bills that two deputies
have cosponsored together. Compared with other parliaments, such as the American Congress
or the German Bundestag, a distinguishing feature in the history of the Italian Parliament is
the presence of a large number of political factions. Our primary aim is to infer a graph that
summarizes collaborations within and between parties from the network of bill cosponsorships,
whose actors are the deputies.
We tackle this issue by viewing edges eij in the graph as a result of a Poisson process that
explicitly depends on group memberships of nodes i and j, as well as on their individual at-
tributes. The model that we propose builds on the stochastic block models that are employed in
social network analysis, which we review in Section 1.1. We resort to generalized linear mod-
els and derive measures of group relevance, and of collaboration or repulsion between groups.
Finally, we propose a penalized inference approach for stochastic block models that enables
us to reduce model complexity. We show that, with the use of penalized likelihood methods, a
sparse reduced graph representing collaborations (and repulsions) between political parties can
be obtained directly from the signs of the model parameters.
Our analysis demonstrates the evolution of the Italian political system froma highly polarized
political arena, in which deputies base collaborations on their identification with left- or right-
wing values, towards an increasingly fragmented parliament, where a rigid separation of parties
into coalitions does not hold any more, and collaborations beyond the perimeter of coalitions
have become possible.
1.1. Stochastic block models
Community membership can play an important role in shaping social interactions. Social net-
works are often featured by the presence of clusters of units that are strongly linked between
themselves and weakly connected to individuals that fall outside their cluster, so that ignoring
the preferential attachment of units based on community membership can lead to misleading
interpretations of the determinants of network ties. Thus, cluster identification and assessment
of the relationship between groups of nodes in a network have been active topics of research in
the analysis of social networks.
Stochastic block models were first introduced as a modification of the p1-class of models for
unweighted digraphs that was proposed by Holland and Leinhardt (1981). If we denote by Xij
a Bernoulli random variable that takes value 1 if an arrow from node i to node j is present,
and is 0 otherwise, then the p1-model assumes that pairs of edges or dyads Yij = .Xij,Xji/
are stochastically independent and expresses the probability of observing the arrow Xij as a
function of four parameters, representing the density of the graph θ, the tendency of arrows
to be reciprocated, ρ, expansiveness, αi, and popularity, βj, of nodes i and j. Fienberg and
Wasserman (1981) considered a situation in which a partition of units into p groups, also called
blocks, is available, proposing a more parsimonious representation where αi and βj are replaced
by p expansiveness group effects αr, such that αi =αi′ for every i and i′ belonging to block r,
and p popularity group effects βs.
The definition of a stochastic block model was proposed by Holland et al. (1983). According
to their definition, a probability distribution for a graph defines a stochastic block model if
the random variables Xij are independent, and the random vectors Xij and Xkl are identically
distributed if nodes i and k are members of the same block r, and j and l are in the same block
s. Stochastic block models imply that nodes within a block are stochastically equivalent, in the
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sense that, if nodes i and k belong to the same block r, any probability statement on the graph
is left unchanged by interchanging them. Holland et al. (1983) criticized the model that was
proposed by Fienberg andWasserman (1981), deeming it too restrictive, and advocated that the
parameters θ, αr and βs should be replaced by one parameter θrs for each pair of blocks .r, s/.
Later,Wang andWong (1987) proposed a networkmodel that retains the original formulation
of the p1-model with individual effects αi and βj but also includes a set of block interaction
parameters φrs: one for each pair of blocks .r, s/.
Anderson et al. (1992) elaborated on the idea of stochastic block models, viewing them as
‘a mapping of approximately equivalent actors into blocks or positions and a statement regarding the
relations between the positions’.
They considered the p1-class of models, and they proposed to represent relational ties between
blocks of units by means of a reduced graph. They obtained such a graph setting a cut-off c on
the predicted probability of observing an arrow from nodes in group r to nodes in group s, πˆrs,
and drawing an arrow from r to s if πˆrs >c.
Stochastic blockmodels have alsobeen employed for community detection innetworks, rather
than to describe relationships between blocks of nodes that are known a priori. This type of
block modelling aims to find clusters of highly interconnected nodes and it is referred to as a
posteriori block modelling (Wasserman and Anderson, 1987; Nowicki and Snijders, 2001).
2. Bill cosponsorship in the Italian Parliament
The Italian Parliament is based on a bicameral system in which two separate assemblies, the
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, play similar roles in the legislative process. Legislations
can be proposed by different actors (including deputies, senators, the government, regions and
groups of electors); here, we focus on legislation proposed by deputies. Each bill can be proposed
by a single deputy, or cosponsored by a group of deputies. In the second case, bill cosponsorship
defines a symmetric relationship between deputies, who formally state their agreement on the
content of the proposed legislation by cosponsoring it. Thus, cosponsorship can be taken as a
measure of proximity or collaboration between deputies.
Bill cosponsorship can be represented as an undirected network where nodes represent par-
liamentarians, and the presence of an edge eij indicates that parliamentarians i and j have
cosponsored at least one legislation. We associate with each edge a weight equal to the number
of bills that the two parliamentarians have sponsored together in a given time course (typically,
one legislature).
In the Italian Chamber, each deputy is required to express their affiliation to one and only one
parliamentary group, which typically corresponds to a political party or to a coalition of parties.
As a consequence, membership of parliamentary groups generates a partition of deputies into
political groups, which we use to assess the patterns of collaboration between political parties.
Data on bill cosponsorship in 27 parliamentary chambers of 20 European countries have
been recently collected by Briatte (2016), who has created and published the corresponding
cosponsorship networks. Here we consider the cosponsorship networks for the Italian Chamber
of Deputies between the XIVth and the XVIIth legislatures (2001–2015) and we integrate these
data with personal details on deputies retrieved from the Web site of the Chamber of Deputies
(http://dati.camera.it).
The data that are analysed in the paper and the programs that were used to analyse them can
be obtained from
http://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/rss-datasets
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3. Poisson process model of bill cosponsorship
A graph is a pair G = .V ,E/, which consists of a set of nodes V = {1, : : : ,n} connected by a
set of edges E⊆V ×V . Edges represent relationships between nodes, and they can be directed
or undirected, as well as weighted or unweighted. In bill cosponsorship networks, each node
represents a parliamentarian and a weighted undirected edge between two parliamentarians
displays the number of bills that they have cosponsored together. Thus, hereafter we consider
the case of an undirected graph, where a discrete weight is associated with each edge. Such a
graph can be conveniently represented by means of a symmetric adjacency matrix Y , where we
set yij =0 if deputies i and j are not connected, and yij equal to the number of cosponsorships
between deputies i and j otherwise. We assume absence of self-loops, i.e. yii =0.
3.1. Data-generating process
We view the process of creation of edges in the graph as the result of a multivariate Poisson
process in a given time course T . To wit, we can associate a Poisson process Nij.t/ with rate
λij with each pair of deputies .i, j/ in the graph. At the beginning of the legislature, i.e. t = 0,
no cosponsorship has occurred yet, so Nij.0/= 0. If after some time t1 a first cosponsorship
takes place between deputies i and j, we set Nij.t1/= 1. If a second interaction occurs at t2,
we set Nij.t2/=2, and so on. Thus, Nij.t/ denotes the number of bill cosponsorships that have
occurred between i and j at a given time point t. If we stop the process at t =T , the number
of cosponsorships Nij.T/ that are observed until T between each pair .i, j/ of deputies is a
realization from a Poisson distribution with mean μij =λijT and it defines a weighted graph,
where yij =Nij.T/.
Now, suppose that a partition P of deputies into p groups or blocks is available, and that
block membership determines the rates of each Poisson process, so that we can assume that the
interaction rates λij are homogeneous within each pair of blocks .r, s/:
λij = ζrs ∀ i∈ group r, ∀ j ∈ group s, r, s∈{1, : : : ,p}: .1/
Under the assumption of independence between the univariate processes, equation (1) defines
a stochastic blockmodel, becauseNij.t/ andNkj.t/ are independent, and they are also identically
distributed if i and k belong to the same block. Our primary interest is to understand which
groups are more active in the network, and how members from different groups interact with
each other. Thus, we would like to decompose μrs = ζrsT into a baseline parameter θ0 that
controls the overall bill cosponsorship activity in the network, two main effects αr and αs that
account for the relative importance (productivity or popularity) of political parties r and s,
and an interaction term φrs that accounts for collaboration (if positive), indifference (if null)
or repulsion (if negative), between pairs of parties. Since a linear relationship between μrs and
θ0,αr,αs and φrs is impossible for the range R+ of μrs, we consider a monotone transformation
g :R+ →R of μrs to be linear in the parameters, i.e.
g.μrs/=θ0 +αr +αs +φrs: .2/
A convenient choice for g is represented by the logarithm, but alternative choices for g can be
considered as well.
The stochastic block model in equation (2) implies stochastic equivalence of nodes within
each block. As already noted by Wang and Wong (1987), stochastic equivalence is often an
unrealistic and restrictive assumption. First, it is reasonable to imagine that deputies from the
same party might behave differently. Furthermore, factors other than bill cosponsorship could
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also play a role in the choice to cosponsor bills. Therefore, we extend model (2) to let the mean
of each univariate process depend also on a set of node- or edge-specific covariates xij, with an
associated parameter vector β:
yij|.i∈ r, j ∈ s,xij/∼Poi.μij =λijT/,
g.μij/=θ0 +αr +αs +φrs +xijβ:
.3/
Model (3) is not a proper stochastic block model, because it allows μij =μkj for two units i
and k belonging to the same group r. Nevertheless, it retains its focus on the role that is played by
blocks in shaping the network, including specific sets of parameters αr for block relevance and
φrs for interactions within and between blocks. Clearly, model (2) can be derived as a particular
case of model (3) by setting β=0.
Model estimation can be performed by specifying a suitable generalized linear model (Nelder
and Wedderburn, 1972; McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). We model the data-generating process
in equation (3) with
log.μij/=θ0 +
p∑
r=1
αrDr.i/+
p∑
r=1
αrDr.j/+
p∑
r6s
φrsDrs.i, j/+xijβ, .4/
where Dr.i/ = I.i ∈ r/ and Drs.i, j/ = I.i ∈ r, j ∈ s ∨ i ∈ s, j ∈ r/ for r6 s = 1, : : : ,p are dummy
variables that indicate whether a unit i belongs to group r, or whether the pair of nodes .i, j/
implies an interaction between blocks r and s. However, model (4) is not identifiable without
further constraints. Typically the way in which identifiability constraints are specified is not
particularly important, as eachparameterization is equivalent; however, aswe shall bepenalizing
some parameters in later sections, the parameterization will be important. Thus, we introduce
the following identifiability conditions:
p∑
r=1
αr =0 and
p∑
s=1
φrs =0 ∀ r=1, : : : ,p, .5/
where for ease of notation we write φsr =φrs. If we incorporate these constraints in equation (4)
by letting α1 =−Σpr=2 αr and φrr =−Σs =r φrs, ∀ r=1, : : : ,p, the model can be rewritten as
log.μij/=θ0 +
p∑
r=2
αrTr.i/+
p∑
r=2
αrTr.j/+
p∑
r<s
φrsTrs.i, j/+xijβ, .6/
where Tr.i/=Dr.i/−D1.i/, r =1, and Trs.i, j/=Drs.i, j/−Drr.i, j/−Dss.i, j/, r = s.
3.2. Extendibility
Themodel thatweproposediffers fromtraditional statisticalmodels,where theoutcomevariable
refers to a single statistical unit. An edge eij involves, in fact, two statistical units, i and j. This, in
turn, implies that covariates that measure individual features ought to be transformed into edge
attributes before they can be included inmodel (6). As an example, the sex, F orM, of two nodes
gives rise to three possible edges: edges involving two males, MM, two females, FF, or one male
and one female individual, FM. The ages of two individuals could be transformed into their
absolute difference, or some other transformation such as their average, minimumormaximum.
The unusual nature of thismodelmakes us examine its relevant invariance properties.Wit and
McCullagh (2001) introduced the concept of extendibility of a statistical model, arguing that a
sensible model is the model that, depending on the particular circumstances, can accommodate
further treatments, or fewer covariate levels or changes ofmeasurement scale than those actually
observed. They advocated that invariance under selection of treatments, merging of covariate
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levels and changes of measurement scale should be explicitly discussed when a new statistical
model is introduced, and they showed that some commonly used models fail in this respect.
In our context, one could wonder whether it is sensible to require invariance with respect to
group selection (introduction or elimination of a party), group merging (union of two existing
parties) or changes of the measurement scale for yij. The answer to the first two points is strictly
connected to what we consider to be a group: in the context of bill cosponsorship networks,
each deputy joins a parliamentary group, so a block is a group of deputies who share similar
political views and come together to promote the same political agenda. We therefore would
like our model to retain its structure irrespectively of the fact that certain groups of individuals
have been included or excluded from the analysis. However, if two parliamentary groups were
to be merged this would produce a new political group, whose features would be different from
those of either of the two original groups. For these reasons, we require model invariance under
selection of groups, whereas we do not require invariance under group merging.
Invariance under selection of groups requires that, if one group—say the pth group—is ex-
cluded from model (6) and the new model
log.μ′ij/= θ′0 +
p−1∑
r=2
α′rTr.i/+
p−1∑
r=2
α′rTr.j/+
p−1∑
r<s
φ′rsTrs.i, j/+xijβ,
subject to
p−1∑
r=1
α′r =0 and
p−1∑
s=1
φ′rs =0,∀ r=1, : : : ,p−1, .7/
is considered, then it is possible to derive the parameters of model (7) as a function of the
parameters of model (6). Indeed, this can be achieved by imposing μ′rs =μrs, r6 s=1, : : : ,p−1
(selection requirement), and solving the resulting system of linear equations.
Finally, one might wonder whether it would be sensible to require invariance with respect to
changes of measurement scale. Since the edge weights yij are counts, it does not make sense to
apply translations or dilatations to yij. However, we can consider changes of timescale and ask
how this affects the block means μrs. Consider a change of timescale from a system A with time
expressed as TA and rates as ζArs to a system B with time TB and rates ζ
B
rs. For example, system A
could consider days and system B hours as time unit, so that TA =TB=24 and ζArs =24ζBrs. More
generally, we can let ζArs =kζBrs, k>0. Since TA =k−1TB, the block means μrs are not affected by
the change of time system:
μArs =TAζArs =k−1TBkζBrs =TBζBrs =μBrs:
This result implies that the parameters θ0, αr and φrs in model (2) are left unchanged, so that
the model is invariant with respect to changes of timescale measurement.
4. Inference
4.1. Parameter estimation
The parameter vector θ= .θ0,α2, : : : ,αp,φ12,φ13, : : : ,φp−1,p,β/ that is associated with model
(6) has dimension q=dim.θ/=p.p+ 1/=2+dim.β/. In principle, it could be estimated with
maximum likelihood. However, the number of model parameters q increases quadratically with
the number of blocks p. In such cases, maximum likelihood estimation could yield solutions
with an extremely large number of parameters, making interpretation cumbersome. Instead, we
advocate the use of penalized likelihood methods to achieve a parsimonious solution.
Besides enhancing model interpretability, penalized likelihood methods enable us to detect
potentially sparse block-model-generating mechanisms. In stochastic block models, the block
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interaction parameter φrs indicates an attraction (φrs >0) or repulsion (φrs <0) between the pair
of blocks .r, s/, but it can also indicate indifference between some pairs of blocks—a situation
that translates into φrs = 0 in model (3). Whereas maximum likelihood is unlikely to produce
model estimates φˆrs that are exactly null, penalized likelihood is capable of distinguishing these
cases of indifference by shrinking to 0 some of the block interaction parameters.
Since the introduction of the lasso (Tibshirani, 1996), penalized inference has become a
popular choice for variable selection and the solution of high dimensional problems. Many
methods in this field have been introduced (see Bu¨hlmann and van de Geer (2011) and Fan
and Li (2001) for an overview). In this paper we use the adaptive lasso (Zou, 2006), which is a
weighted extension of the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (the lasso) that was
introduced by Tibshirani (1996), because it has good consistency properties.
The adaptive lasso aims for a sparse model solution by maximizing a penalized likelihood
that incorporates the log-likelihood of the model, and a weighted l1-penalty on the parameters
that are included in the model. This penalty is multiplied by a tuning parameter δ> 0, which
determines the amount of regularization that is imposed on the parameters. The adaptive lasso
problem for model (6) is
max
θ
log{L.θ/}− δ
q∑
j=1
wj|θj|, .8/
where L.θ/ denotes the likelihood of the model and wj is the weight that is associated with the
jth element θj of θ. The tuning parameter δ is typically chosen either by cross-validation, or
by minimizing a suitably defined information criterion. We discuss this issue in more detail in
Section 4.2.
Denote by θÅ a consistent estimator of θ and by N =n.n−1/=2 the total number of pairs of
nodes in the network. The attractive feature of the adaptive lasso is that if the weight vector is
defined as w=1=|θÅ|γ , and if δ=√N →0 and δN.γ−1/=2 →∞, then the adaptive lasso estimator
θˆ is consistent in variable selection (see theorem 4 in Zou (2006)).
The choice of the parameters that are subject to the l1-penalty mostly depends on the role
and the meaning that we associate with them. In our view, the block interaction parameter φrs
expresses the presence of a collaboration or repulsion between deputies in parties r and s after
we have accounted for both the overall density of the network, θ0, and the relevance of the
groups, αr and αs. To retain this interpretation, we do not penalize θ0 nor αr, r =1, : : : ,p, i.e.
we set wj =0 if j ∈{1, : : : ,p}.
However, we aim to achieve some sparsity in the representation of relationships between
groups by penalizing theφrs-coefficients (r =s), aswell asβ. For the penaltyweights, we compute
the maximum likelihood estimate θˆ and set wj =1=|θˆj|γ , with γ =2, for j>p.
Because of the identifiability conditions in equation (5), the parameters φrr (r ∈ {1, : : : ,p})
that control interactions within each block do not explicitly appear in model (6) and, thus,
they cannot be penalized. This implies that only the p.p−1/=2 interactions between different
blocks canbepenalized,whereas thepparameters forwithin-block interactions are subsequently
derived as φˆrr =−Σs =r φˆrs, ∀ r=1, : : : ,p. In practice, in real networks with community structure
those parameters are typically strongly positive and, thus, unlikely to be shrunk to 0. For this
reason, we believe that the parameterization in equation (6) represents the best compromise
between identifiability and the need to penalize as many interaction terms as possible.
4.2. Model selection
In a penalized likelihood framework, the tuning parameter δ determines the amount of regular-
ization that it is imposed on the parameters and, eventually, the level of sparsity of the solution.
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Two main approaches are typically employed for the selection of an optimal tuning parameter
δÅ: cross-validation, or minimization of model information criteria. In the latter case, we seek
δÅ =argmin
δ
.Dδ +amhδ/, .9/
where Dδ denotes the deviance of the model, m the number of observations and hδ the di-
mensionality of the model. Various choices have been proposed for am. Alongside Akaike’s
information criterion AIC, which sets am = 2, and the Bayesian information criterion BIC,
which takes am = log.m/, recent proposals include the generalized information criterion GIC of
Fan and Tang (2013), where am = log{log.m/} log.hδ/, and the modified BIC MBIC of Chand
(2012), where am =√m=hδ.
Here, we consider four simulations to assess the performance of these criteria in the selection
of δ. In each simulation, we generate a sequence of networks with increasing number of nodes
n = 50, 100, 150, : : : , 500, following the block model that is defined by equation (2). We set
θ0 =0:7 and draw αr ∈U.−0:3, 0:3/, r>1. Moreover, we set some φrs-coefficients, r = s, equal
to 0 and draw the remaining coefficients in such a way that |φrs|∼U.cmin, cmax/, with cmax =0:5.
Coefficientsα1 andφrr, r=1, : : : ,p, are subsequently derived fromequation (5). The simulations
differ for the number h of null φrs-coefficients (r = s) and for the betamin condition (|φrs|>cmin)
that is imposed on the non-null φrs-coefficients; Table 1 in the on-line supplementary material
summarizes the different settings in each simulation.
We perform model selection over a grid of 100 δ-values. Each selection criterion leads to an
optimal δ and corresponding model estimates. To compare the performance of each criterion
in the selection of models that are capable of correctly distinguishing signals (φrs =0) and non-
signals (φrs =0), we compute the accuracy of each solution, i.e.
accuracy= true positives + true negatives
p.p−1/=2 ,
and we compare it with the maximum achievable accuracy for the set of 100 models that are
considered. As shown in Fig. 1 of the supplementary material, every criterion quickly achieves
the maximum accuracy when a dense model is considered (simulation A), but the accuracy of
cross-validation, AIC and MBIC is often lower when sparser models are considered (simula-
tions B and C), or when signal detection is complicated by the imposition of a milder betamin
condition (simulation D). Overall, BIC andGIC outperform the competing methods and, thus,
they appear to be the best information criteria for variable selection.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a) An unweighted graph with 50 nodes, partitioned into five groups and (b) a simplified represen-
tation of relationships between groups: , set 1; , set 2; , set 3; , set 4; , set 5
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4.3. The reduced graph
A focal aspect of stochastic block models is the description of the relationships between blocks
of individuals. Anderson et al. (1992) proposed to represent relational ties between blocks of
units by means of a reduced graph, whose nodes are the blocks. The idea behind this reduced
graph is quite simple: summarize the original graph by visualizing relationships between blocks
directly, to achieve a simpler and clearer representation.
As an example, consider the graph in Fig. 1(a). Three groups of nodes (sets 1, 4 and 5) appear
to be featured by a strong internal connectivity; besides, nodes within each group tend to be
preferentially linked to nodes belonging to one or two other groups; for example, it appears
that nodes in set 3 tend to prefer nodes in sets 1 and 2 to nodes in sets 4 and 5. On the basis of
similar observations, we can attempt to draw a reduced graph that summarizes our intuition:
the graph in Fig. 1(b) provides an example.
Different strategies to derive a reduced graph from a statistical model can be considered.
Anderson et al. (1992) obtained such a graph setting a cut-off c on the predicted probability of
observing an arrow from nodes in a group r to nodes in a group s, πˆrs, and drawing an arrow
from r to s if πˆrs > c. The resulting reduced graph links blocks that are highly connected, but
edges therein do not necessarily display attraction between groups. For example, nodes in a
group r could have overall higher degrees: if this is so, block r would be connected to any group,
just as a result of the high average degree of nodes in the block.Moreover, their approach cannot
be easily generalized to edge-valued graphs.
Therefore, we propose an alternative strategy to derive a reduced graph displaying collabo-
rations between parties, which is based on the parameter estimates φˆrs in model (6) rather than
on μˆrs (or πˆrs). By doing so, we control for the average degree of blocks r and s, as well as for
the effect of individual covariates. Since an estimate φˆrs > 0 entails evidence of collaboration
between deputies in parties r and s, we draw an edge between blocks r and s if φˆrs >0.
Furthermore, it is also possible to derive a reduced graph that displays repulsions by connect-
ing blocks such that φˆrs <0. In an unpenalized likelihood framework, however, such a reduced
graph is uninteresting, as it is simply the complement of the reduced graph of collaborations.
Instead, as discussed in Section 4.1, penalized inference enables us to distinguish collaborations
and repulsions from situations of indifference between parties. In a penalized likelihood setting,
then, the reduced graph of repulsions is not just the complement of the reduced graph of col-
laborations, but it becomes an interesting outcome of model estimation that can highlight those
pairs of parties whose members avoid working with each other.
5. Analysis of bill cosponsorship networks of the Italian Chamber of Deputies
We consider now the networks representing bill cosponsorship in the Italian Chamber of
Deputies, which we have described in Section 2. We focus our attention on the cosponsorship
networks of the four legislatures XIV–XVII, covering the period 2001–2015. During this period,
the number of parliamentary groups ranged from 8 (legislatures XIV and XVI) to 10 (XVII)
and 13 (legislature XV); in each legislature, a mixed group has always been present, gathering
deputies from small political groups with different political orientation, which did not meet the
requirements (defined in the Chamber’s regulations) for the creation of a parliamentary group.
We study the dependence between bill cosponsorship and parliamentary groups, controlling
for some individual attributes of the deputies. In particular, we consider gender, education level
(undergraduate versus graduate), age, seniority and the electoral constituency of each deputy.
Gender can give rise to edges involving two male, MM, two female, FF, and a female and a
male, FM, deputies; we take MM as reference. Likewise, we take interactions between two un-
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dergraduate deputies, UU, as reference and introduce dummies for graduate–undergraduate,
GU, and graduate–graduate, GG, interactions. We distinguish senior deputies, S, who had al-
ready been parliamentarians before their election in a given legislature, from junior deputies,
J, who were first experiencing being deputies. We set interactions between junior deputies, JJ,
as reference mode and introduce two dummies for junior–senior, JS, and senior–senior, SS,
interactions. Furthermore, we consider the age difference of the two deputies. We take Lom-
bardia as reference electoral constituency, and we introduce 20 fixed effects for the remaining
constituencies (19 regions plus the constituency for electors living abroad). We also consider a
dummy indicating whether two deputies have been elected in the same constituency.
A commonly observed feature of social networks is the presence of triadic effects. For binary
graphs, these triadic effects correspond to the fact that the probability of observing an edge
between two individuals increases with the number of common neighbours that they share. This
idea is the basis of exponential random graph models for binary graphs (Frank and Strauss,
1986), whose estimation relies on Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation techniques (Snijders,
2002) and is typically unfeasible for networks featuring more than a few hundred nodes. Exten-
sions of exponential random graph models for edge-valued graphs have been recently proposed
(Desmarais and Cranmer, 2012; Krivitsky, 2012), but the estimation of the transitivity effect for
large networks remains an open issue. To account for triadic effects, we consider for each pair
of nodes .i, j/ the statistic TRij =Σk =i,jyikyjk, whose value increases with the number of shared
cosponsors, as well as with the frequency of cosponsorships undertaken with them. We include
TRij in model (6) and estimate its parameter with a penalized pseudolikelihood approach. We
remark that the performance of penalized pseudolikelihood in the estimation of the transitivity
term of exponential random graph models has not been investigated yet, and the inclusion of
TRij in the model should be regarded just as an attempt to account for transitivity effects on
bill cosponsorship.
For each legislature, we estimate model (6) with the adaptive lasso, using BIC to select the
tuning parameter δ. Table 1 shows the estimates of θ0 andβ (except for the regional effects, which
are reported in Table 2 of the on-line supplementary material). The estimate of the intercept
θ0 is lower for legislatures XV and XVII, coherently with the fact that the networks for those
legislatures refer to shorter timeframes (less than 3 years versus the 5 years of legislatures XIV
Table 1. Effect of individual attributes on bill cosponsorship†
Covariate Results for the following legislatures:
XIV XV XVI XVII
Intercept θ0 −2:693 −3:184 −2:767 −3:598
Female–male FM 0.139 0.155 0.208 0.211
Female–female FF 0.604 0.714 0.689 0.642
Graduate–undergraduate GU 0.155 0.000 0.011 0.000
Graduate–graduate GG 0.158 0.000 0.000 −0:157
Same electoral constituency 0.527 0.516 0.537 0.535
Junior–senior JS −0:045 0.043 0.000 0.231
Senior–senior SS −0:004 0.127 0.176 0.571
Age difference −0:020 0.000 −0:061 −0:040
Transitivity 0.189 0.131 0.058 0.067
†The table displays the estimates of θ0 (unpenalized) and β (penalized) in
model (6) for the following legislatures: XIV (2001–2006), XV (2006–2008),
XVI (2008–2013) and XVII (2013–2015).
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and XVI). Bill cosponsorships turn out to be more frequent between female deputies (FF) and,
in general, they are more likely to take place if at least one of the sponsors is female (FM). The
effect of education, instead, is not stable over time. The positive estimates that are associated
with pairs of deputies who were elected in the same electoral constituency clearly point out that
deputies tend to collaborate on the basis of geographic proximity. Whereas in legislature XIV
junior deputies were slightly more productive than their senior colleagues, from legislature XV
onwards cosponsorships involve more senior than junior deputies. Moreover, cosponsorships
aremore frequent betweendeputies of similar age. Finally,wefind evidence of transitivity effects.
The effects that are associated with each constituency (Table 2 of the supplementary material)
are mostly shrunk to 0 and they do not point to any peculiar temporal pattern.
The pattern of interactions between political parties can be reconstructed by inspecting the
reduced graphs of collaborations in Fig. 2, where an edge displays collaborations (φˆrs > 0)
between two parliamentary groups, a self-loop indicates that there is a tendency of deputies to
cosponsor with deputies from the same parliamentary group and node size is proportional to
the relative frequency of cosponsorship, αˆr, of deputies in each group. Conversely, the reduced
graphs representing repulsions (φˆrs < 0) between parties are shown in Fig. 2 of the on-line
supplementary material.
The first, interesting, conclusion is that cosponsorships during legislatures XIV and XV re-
flected collaborations within each party, and between parties that belonged to the same political
coalition. In fact, both legislatures featured strong competition between two coalitions, one of
which (the right wing in the first case, and the left wing in the latter) held the majority in the
parliament and could, thus, govern on its own. This situation seems to have generated a strong
ideological polarization, which is evident from the pattern of collaborations (and repulsions)
between the parliamentary groups.
The division of theChamber into two coalitions endedwith legislatureXVI, as a centrist party
(the Unione di Centro, UDC) that was not part of any coalition entered the Chamber. For 3
years, the majority was held by the right-wing coalition, whereas the UDC and the left-wing
coalition were in opposition. 3 years later, a group of right-wing deputies formed the Futuro e
Liberta` per l’Italia party, FLI, a newpolitical group that abandoned the right-wing coalition and
entered a centrist coalitionwith theUDC. 1 year later, the right-wing government resigned and a
coalition government, supported by a heterogeneous coalition of parties, took its place. Besides
cosponsorships within each parliamentary group, our model detects collaborations between the
main right-wing party (the Popolo della Liberta` party, PDL) and FLI, between two opposition
parties (Partito Democratico, PD, and UDC) and between a left-wing party (the Italia dei
Valori party, IDV) and a right-wing group (the Popolo e Territorio party, P&T). It is also
interesting to consider the reducedgraphdisplaying repulsions:mostof the edges therein indicate
(not surprisingly) the absence of collaborations between parties from different coalitions, but
also between the UDC and FLI, which allied towards the end of the legislature. In short,
cosponsorships in this legislature seem to reflect mostly the division between the right-wing
majority (FLI, the Lega Nord party, LN, PDL and P&T) and the opposition (PD, IDV, UDC)
of the first half of the legislature, despite the fact that the analysis considers cosponsorships over
the whole legislature span. A possible explanation for this result is that cosponsorship events are
more likely to take place in the first years of each legislature: as amatter of fact, owing to the long
time that is typically necessary for a bill of parliamentary initiative to be discussed and approved,
a bill that is proposed towards the end of the legislature is extremely unlikely to be approved,
and this can in turn discourage deputies from proposing bills in the last years of their mandate.
The fragmentation in the composition of the Chamber has become even stronger in the cur-
rent legislature (XVII). Since none of the four coalitions now represented in the Parliament (left
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wing, right wing, the centrist Scelta Civica, SC, and theMovimento 5 Stelle, M5S) could form a
government alone, alliances between parties belonging to different coalitions had to be sought,
giving rise to heterogeneous parliamentary majorities. In this case, the reduced graph in Fig. 2
shows that, besides self-loops accounting for a tendency towards within-group cosponsorship,
deputies from different right-wing parties collaborate with each other. Moreover, deputies from
the centrist party SC collaborate with deputies belonging to the CentroDemocratico party, CD,
a left-wing party which is ideologically alike the SC but belongs to a different political coalition.
Further collaborations are detected between two left-wing parties (PD and the Sinistra Ecologı´a
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Fig. 2. Reduced graphs representing collaborations between parliamentary groups based on bill cospon-
sorship (the graphs display collaborations based on model 6 (i.e. ˆφrs >0);, right-wing parliamentary groups;, left-wing groups; , centrist groups; , the mixed group; , M5S) (node size is proportional to the produc-
tivity of each parliamentary group, αˆr ): (a) legislature XIV (2001–2006); (b) legislature XV (2006–2008); (c)
legislature XVI (2008–2013); (d) legislature XVII (2013–2015)
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Liberta` party, SEL) and between the mixed group and various parties. Apart from a collabora-
tion with the mixed group, deputies from M5S do not seem to collaborate with any other party.
In short, our analysis of bill cosponsorship networks indicates the evolution from a highly
polarized political arena, inwhich deputies based collaborations on their identificationwith left-
or right-wing values, towards an increasingly fragmented parliament, where a rigid separation
of political groups into coalitions does not seem to hold any more, and collaborations beyond
the perimeter of coalitions have become possible. One of the drivers of this change is probably a
change of electoral law in 2005, which made it more difficult for coalitions of parties to obtain
a majority in the Senate. This resulted in the premature end of legislature XV and in less stable
parliamentary majorities in legislatures XVI and XVII. Our analysis of bill cosponsorships
suggests that also the pattern of collaborations between parliamentarians was affected, inducing
deputies to collaborate more frequently with deputies from different political coalitions.
6. Conclusion and discussion
Community affiliation can deeply affect social behaviour and the formation of relationships
between individuals. In social network analysis, stochastic block models represent a popular
approach to account for the effect of community membership on the creation of ties and to
assess community structures.
In this paper, we have developed an extended stochastic block model for the analysis of bill
cosponsorships in the Italian Parliament. This model retains the focus on relationships between
pairs of blocks that characterize pure stochastic blockmodels by including parameters for group
productivity, αr, and interactions between pairs of groups, φrs, but it also allows heterogeneity
of units within a block. Because the number of parameters increases quadratically with the num-
ber of groups, we advocate the use of a penalized estimation approach to select a parsimonious
model that displays relevant collaborations and repulsions between pairs of blocks. We repre-
sent these preferential relationships by means of reduced graphs displaying the relationships
that exist between blocks.
Our analysis of bill cosponsorship in the Italian Chamber of Deputies from 2001 to 2015
demonstrates the evolution from a political system that was strongly polarized into a left- and a
right-wing coalition, in which bill cosponsorship took place almost exclusively between deputies
belonging to the same coalition, towards an increasingly fragmented political arena, with more
than two coalitions of parties and in which collaborations beyond the perimeter of coalitions
are now possible.
Although here we have considered networks where edges are undirected and weighted, with
weights in the set of natural numbers, the models that we propose can be easily generalized in
two directions. Directed edges can be handled by introducing a reciprocity term and a further
set of nodal effects to distinguish sender and receiver nodes. As an example, model (3) can be
adapted as follows:
yij|.i∈ r, j ∈ s/∼Poi.μij/,
log.μij/=θ0 +ρ+αr +γs +φrs +xijβ,
where αr measures the productivity of group r (which the sender node i belongs to), γs the
popularity of group s (which the receiver node j belongs to) and ρ the tendency to reciprocate
arrows. Here a positive φrs denotes attraction or repulsion from nodes in group r towards nodes
in group s, and, consequently, φrs =φsr.
Moreover, the use of generalized linear models enables us to extend model (3) easily beyond
Poisson processes. For example, if the network is unweighted (i.e. yij ∈{0, 1}) it suffices to replace
14 M. Signorelli and E. C. Wit
the Poisson with a Bernoulli distribution, and the log-link with a logit or a probit link function;
if a weighted network with weights in the set of real numbers is at hand, the Poisson distribution
can be replaced with any continuous distribution, and the identity function becomes a natural
choice for g.
We remark that our data analysis relies on bill cosponsorship networks that are aggregated
over the span of each legislature (Briatte, 2016). This does not allow us to take into account
possible changes inmembershipofparliamentary groupswithin a legislature, apractice—known
as trasformismo—that is quite frequent in the Italian Parliament. For this reason, we have relied
on the group memberships of each deputy as reported on the Web site of the Italian Chamber
of Deputies (http://dati.camera.it). In principle, our model is capable of handling this
situation. If, for example, deputy i has been member of party q for a timespan equal to t1 and of
party r for t2, the number of bills that they have cosponsored with deputy j ∈ s is still a Poisson
process:
Nij.t1 + t2/=Nij.t1/+Nij.t2/∼Poi.λqst1 +λrst2/:
Thus, availability of data disaggregated over time would allow us to cope with these changes in
party membership, providing a more realistic account of this phenomenon. Furthermore, this
would also entitle us to model directly the interaction rates λij between deputies, which (as we
pointed out in our comment on the results for legislature XVI) is unlikely to be constant across
the legislature (because of both procedural issues and the changing political environment). In
particular, it would make it possible to verify the hypothesis that most cosponsorships take
place at the beginning of the legislature.
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Table 1: An overview of Simulations A-D. In Simulation A, we consider
a dense model (i.e., with high dimensionality h) with a moderate betamin
condition imposed on the non-null φrs coefficients (|φrs| ≥ cmin). We pro-
gressively increase the sparsity of the model in Simulations B and C. In
Simulation D we consider a model with medium sparsity level (like the one
in Simulation B), but we make signal detection harder by imposing a milder
betamin condition.
Simulation # (φrs = 0) h Betamin condition
A 10 45 (dense) cmin = 0.2 (moderate)
B 20 35 (medium) cmin = 0.2 (moderate)
C 30 25 (sparse) cmin = 0.2 (moderate)
D 20 35 (medium) cmin = 0.1 (mild)
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Figure 1: Results of Simulations A-D. Comparison of the accuracy of
models chosen by 10-fold cross-validation (CV), Akaike’s Information Crite-
rion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the Generalized Informa-
tion Criterion (GIC) of Fan and Tang (2013) and the modified BIC (MBIC)
of Chand (2012) with the maximum achievable accuracy (MAX). Every cri-
terion quickly achieves the maximum accuracy in Simulation A, where we
consider a model with few null φrs. In Simulations B, C and D, instead,
BIC and GIC outperform CV, AIC and MBIC: this is particularly apparent
when a sparser model is considered (Simulation C), or when signal detection
is made harder by the imposition of a milder betamin condition (Simulation
D).
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Table 2: Parameter estimates of regional effects (reference mode: Lom-
bardia). Note that most of the effects are shrunk to zero and that, overall,
the effects are not constant over time.
Costituency Legislature
XIV XV XVI XVII
Abruzzo 0 0 0.240 0
Valle d’Aosta 0.750 -0.262 -0.274 0.373
Basilicata 0.146 0 0 0.313
Calabria -0.058 0 0.302 0
Campania 0 0 0.020 -0.289
Emilia Romagna 0 0 0.103 -0.173
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0 0 0 0
Lazio 0.113 0 0 0
Liguria -0.303 0 0 -0.358
Marche 0.029 0 -0.185 0
Molise -0.426 0.382 0.531 0
Piemonte 0.115 0 -0.016 0
Puglia 0 0 0.221 0
Sardegna 0 0 0 0
Sicilia 0 0 0.132 -0.240
Toscana 0 0.098 0.019 -0.283
Trentino Alto Adige -0.028 0 0.332 -0.260
Umbria 0 -0.167 0.398 0
Veneto 0.126 0 -0.281 0
Residents abroad - 0.390 0.705 0
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Figure 2: Reduced graphs representing repulsions between parlia-
mentary groups based on bill cosponsorship. The graphs display re-
pulsions (i.e., φˆrs < 0) between parliamentary groups. White squares denote
right-wing parliamentary groups, white circles left-wing groups and darkgrey
squares centrist groups. A darkgrey circle denotes the mixed group, whereas
a lightgrey circle the Movimento 5 Stelle. Node size is proportional to the
productivity of each parliamentary group (αˆr).
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